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THE ROLE OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The purpose of this paper is to identify and raise for
discussion fundamental questions as to what workmen's
compensation is supposed to do, where it fits within the
scheme of American social insurance, and how it can best
serve and preserve what we have come to think of as
distinctive American values.
This is intended to be a special kind of analysis with a
special purpose. It is not the sort of philosophical specula-
tion one would present in a symposium on jurisprudence
nor is it a general introduction to the philosophy of work-
men's compensation such as one might present to a law
school class. Rather, it is intended to help in laying a firm
bedrock of principle on which those interested in improv-
ing and reforming the American workmen's compensation
system can proceed to build proposals for specific
changes. With this in mind, there will be an attempt to
identify specific practical choices and measures whose
merits will be seen to depend on the underlying principles
discussed.
For the sake of brevity, the discussion will be largely
confined to points on which there is some important con-
troversy that is still affecting decisions today. In other
words, there will not be rehearsed some of the early basic
disputes that have now largely been put behind us, impor-
tant though they may have been in their time.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AS
INCOME INSURANCE
Perhaps the most important single principle affecting
decisions on workmen's compensation issues is the pro-
position that workmen's compensation is one branch of
income insurance, in the same sense as unemployment
insurance, social security, and temporary disability insur-
ance.
Income insurance is a term devised by the writer over
20 years ago to describe an essentially simple concept:
small and regular contributions are made by the employer,
the employee, or both, as a result of which the employee,
on the happening of a specified contingency interrupting
or terminating his earnings, has a right to be paid to him a
portion of his lost income. There are several contingencies
that may cause this interruption or termination of earn-
ings: economic unemployment; physical disability, which
may be occupational or non-occupational; death, which
may be occupational or non-occupational; and old age
retirement.1 When the matter is put this way, it is per-
fectly obvious that workmen's compensation is one seg-
ment of the total scheme of income protection, the princi-
pal variant being the nature of the contingency insured
against. To be sure, there are other differences-in the
identity of the person contributing the "premiums," in
the level of administration, whether State or Federal, and
in the character of financing, whether private insurance or
public. However, the similarities overwhelmingly outweigh
the technical differences.
There is first of all the central insurance principle just
described. Moreover, there is the common principle that
the benefits are for the most part payable without regard
to fault, except the kind of fault that might affect any
insurance. That is to say, workmen's compensation may
not be payable for deliberate self-injury, and unemploy-
ment compensation will not be payable for deliberate re-
fusal to work on a suitable job. Another common charac-
teristic is that benefits are generally limited, both as to
maximum and minimum, but within such limits are re-
lated to the worker's actual earnings in some way. It is
also typical of all these systems that what the worker
owns when the contingency happens is not some large
single sum of money, as might happen with some forms of
private insurance, but the right to be paid weekly or
monthly income benefits, which will stop when he dies 2
or when his situation no longer meets the terms of the
contingency. Finally, these systems have in common their
ultimate purpose, which is to provide an adequate source
of support during periods of wage interruption so as to
prevent the worker or his family from being thrown on
private charity or public relief.
It is equally important to stress what workmen's com-
pensation is not. It is not a branch of strict liability tort
and it is not private insurance.
Throughout most of the earlier history of workmen's
compensation, the tort fallacy was the most prolific
breeder of miscarriages of the compensation idea. It is
now largely being put behind us, but its traces are still to
be seen in some surviving statutory provisions and judicial
decisions. The point is discussed at great length in the
opening chapters of my treatise on workmen's compensa-
tion,3 and there is no purpose to be served in retracing
that argument here. However, there will be noted along
the way several items still being affected by this lingering
fallacy, and they will be dealt with specifically.
The other principal fallacy that crops up in certain
connections is the analogizing of workmen's compensa-
tion with private insurance. It is heard most often these
days in connection with the Social Security offset of
workmen's compensation benefits.4 Perhaps the most
common complaint one hears about this offset runs like
this: "I bought these benefits and I paid for them and I'm
entitled to have both of them." This argument has a little
more substance when applied to Social Security, where
the worker ordinarily does contribute half of the contri-
bution. But the argument also necessarily assumes that the
worker has an equal proprietary right in workmen's com-
pensation, to which he has not contributed at all, or at
least not directly. At this point the argument will be en-
countered that the worker has indirectly contributed even
to his workmen's compensation, on the theory that if he
had not obtained this value in the form of the fringe
benefit of workmen's compensation, it might well have
been paid to him in the form of wages. This argument is
difficult to accept. The employer has assumed the expense
of workmen's compensation premiums because he is abso-
lutely forced to do so by law. The same is true of every
other competitive employer. The idea that individual em-
ployers here and there could be compelled by collective
bargaining to add an equivalent amount to the hourly
wage of workers, in place of workmen's compensation
premiums, when their competitors are not doing so, sim-
ply does not correspond to the facts of industrial life.
Workmen's compensation premiums, then, are not being
paid by the employee, nor are they being paid in the long
run by the employer. They are being paid by the consum-
ing public in the price of the product, which presumably
is adjusted by all competing employers to meet this added
cost because they have under law no choice.
Probably the reason there is so much misunderstand-
ing about the essential nature of workmen's compensation
is that there were two quite different lines of development
in the background dealing with compensation for indus-
trial injury. The development having its roots in Anglo-
American law was the evolution of the Employers' Liabil-
ity Act, which was ultimately based on employer fault
and which modified the common law principally in elimi-
nating or modifying the three common law defenses of
contributory negligence, fellow servant, and assumption
of risk. The other line of development had its origins in
Germany. This was the principle of social insurance, with
its beginnings in the German guilds and its culmination in
the almost comprehensive series of social insurance plans
laid before the Reichstag by Bismarck during the 1880's.5
This latter development, with its complete departure from
the fault principle, was quite alien to Anglo-American
methods of legal thought.
For a number of years in the late 19th century,
American efforts in this problem area followed the Em-
ployers' Liability Act line,6 but beginning about 1913,
there was an extremely abrupt change in the strory. The
Employers' Liability Act approach was largely abandoned
and a fresh start was taken that had its somewhat unfamil-
"iar and uncomfortable roots in Bismarck's Prussia. 7 It is
true that the German social experience example arrived,
not directly, but by way of the first workmen's compensa-
tion acts adopted in England.8 In the process, workmen's
compensation had already begun to take on some traits
influenced by the British tradition.
By far the most conspicuous impact of the common
law tradition, however, was visible not in the language of
the statutes themselves but in the way the courts inter-
preted them. Some judges simply could not believe that
the statute really meant to hold the employer liable abso-
lutely without fault, even when the employee himself
through his own negligence might have been the cause of
the harm. Common law concepts of causation were en-
grafted upon the "arising out of" provision; 9 common law
concepts of scope of employment were superimposed
upon compensation "course of employment"; common
law ideas of definition of a "servant" were pressed into
service to define who is an "employee" under a compensa-
tion act. The history of compensation law interpretation
has for the most part been one of getting away from these
common law glosses and interpreting these modern stat-
utes in line with their own meaning and purpose. The
process is by no means completed, however, and no analy-
sis of the inadequacies of workmen's compensation can
ignore the impact of those restrictive judicial interpreta-
tions that still remain.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AS
INSURANCE AGAINST LOSS OF INCOME
The basic principle here is that, as the name "income
insurance" implies, the thing insured against is loss of
earnings, actual or presumed, and not physical loss of a
member or a bodily function.
This is self-evident from most features of any stand-
ard workmen's compensation statute. It is most dramati-
cally, if unhappily, brought out in the denials of work-
men's compensation for physical losses, however dreadful,
that are not accompanied by significant loss of earnings.
Such physical losses would include impotence,' 0 loss of
child-bearing capacity,' 1 loss of taste and smell, 1 2 pain
and suffering,' 3 and the like. Conversely, a man may be
something less than totally disabled in the physical sense,
but the combination of his particular physical disability
with his previous education and training 1 4 (or lack of it),
or with other economic factors affecting his actual ability
to get work in the disabled condition, will often be held
to equal total permanent disability.' 5
In recent years, this classical principle of workmen's
compensation has been subjected to some challenge and it
is important to inquire how this has come about.
The sequence leading to the present controversy on
this point begins with the near-universal provision for
schedule benefits. Schedule benefits are typically a fixed
number of weeks of benefits for the loss, or loss of use, of
a specified member, without regard to actual wage loss.
This may cut in two directions. A claimant who has had
no actual wage loss may continue to draw schedule bene-
fits after returning to work at full or increased wages. 
16
Conversely, if the statute expressly makes schedule bene-
fits exclusive, a man who remains disabled in fact after the
schedule period has expired may frequently receive no
further benefits. 1
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The schedule principle, however, is not a departure
from the wage-loss principle. There are dozens of state-
ments to this effect in reported cases, and only a handful
of statements taking the opposite view. The only differ-
ence is that the wage loss in the schedule case is conclu-
sively presumed. This is justifiable because the full extent
of the wage loss from a permanent partial disability will
typically never be known at the time of the hearing. It
stretches out over a lifetime, but the award must be paid
now.
The illusion that this is a payment for a lost member
is heightened by the practice of lump summing, which is
all too prevalent in some jurisdictions. When a man re-
ceives a schedule award commuted to a lump sum and
goes away with several hundred dollars for loss of a por-
tion of a finger, it begins to look on the surface very much
like the man has simply been paid a fixed sum of money
for the loss of a fixed portion of the body. But the added
practice of lump summing does not itself change the un-
derlying principle of liability; it is just a different way of
paying for it.
However, when this sort of thing has gone on long
enough, it is not surprising if a great many people get the
idea that what is really going on is cash compensation for
physical losses. When this point has been reached, it is also
perhaps not surprising if some respected authorities in the
field invent a theory or "school of thought" to dignify
what has come about as a -result of a combination of
mistaken notions about the nature of schedule benefits.
Thus one can find debates on the subject of the "whole
man theory,"' 8 and other names given to the idea that a
workman is entitled to be compensated for any physical
loss to the extent that it impairs the physical effectiveness
of the whole man. The writer has, in this instance also,
devoted a long section of the treatise to an examination of
the cases advanced to support this theory, and they prove
on examination to be far too insignificant to be dignified
with the title "school of thought."' 19 South Carolina,
which has been cited as supporting the unorthodox view,
has come out with a resounding reaffirmation of the
wage-loss principle. 20 In New Jersey, it is true that there
can be found dicta questioning the pure wage-loss
theory,21 but there can also be found an equal number of
statements firmly supporting it.22 The vast majority of
American jurisdictions still adhere to the wage-loss princi-
ple and account for schedule and disfigurement awards on
the basis of conclusively presumed impairment of earning
capacity.
This controversy is of prime importance in analyzing
what is wrong with workmen's compensation today. The
trend toward indiscriminate awards of small lump sums
for small permanent partial injuries, the "give-the-poor-
guy-something" attitude, and the perversion of lump-sum
commutations from their original purpose to a facile way
of getting a quick short-term disposition of a case satisfy-
ing to the immediate parties and their attorneys, adds up
to a significant reason why the system is under criticism
and in some instances is not doing the job it was intended
to do.
Once it is firmly understood that the purpose of
workmen's compensation is to provide a steady weekly
income to replace lost wages, it is clearly apparent that
lump summing, except in rare cases, poses a serious danger
of sacrificing the long-term purpose of the system for a
short-term satisfaction. Under most acts, commutation of
an award to a lump sum, at least an award of any size, and
certainly a total permanent disability award, can be justi-
fied only if there is some special use to which the money
will be put that will serve the purposes of the system even
better than the periodic payments. There may be some
kind of small business that the recipient could use for his
future source of income, provided only he had a capital
sum with which to get started. 23 But note carefully that
the ultimate objective should still be sustained income.
More often than not, the lump sum is frittered away, and
society is left with a penniless disabled man on its hands,
as if there had never been a workmen's compensation
system at all.
There is another angle of attack employed by those
who want to break down the orthodox loss-of-earnings
principle. This an argument based on fairness. It is quite
inequitable, so the argument runs, that a man who has
suffered a physical impairment should be deprived of any
recompense whatsoever, in view of the fact that a com-
pensation act will simultaneously stand as a bar to any
common law recovery for the same loss. What this ap-
proach overlooks is that any argument based on genuine
unfairness would have to assume that the injury was attri-
butable to the fault of the employer, using fault in a
genuine moral sense, rather than in some constructive
legal sense. The proportion of industrial accidents due to
this kind of employer fault is very small-much smaller
than the number of injuries due to the fault of the em-
ployee himself.24 The argument could therefore be
turned around. It would be certainly morally unfair to
force the employer to pay the employee for a purely
physical loss that the employee has brought upon himself
by his own negligence or other misconduct. The only way
one can justify employer liability for this kind of loss, in
the absence of fault, is on the theory that the loss in-
volved presents a social problem that must be systemati-
cally taken care of by something like a social insurance
system. This cannot be said of a physical loss not involv-
ing income loss.
The situation is further confused by what has hap-
pened to the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the
Jones Act, 2 s both of which are theoretically based on
employer fault, and accordingly allow full compensatory
damages for physical loss, but both of which have been
virtually converted by judicial decisions into non-fault sta-
tutes.26 With railway workers and seamen thus "getting
the best of both worlds", it becomes increasingly difficult
to insist on retention of the central wage-loss principle of
workmen's compensation.
The practical consequence of all this for compensa-
tion improvement and reform is that it highlights the im-
portance of keeping one's eye on the central purpose of
income maintenance. It has to be assumed that the re-
sources available for distribution under compensation acts
are not infinite. Both in theory, then, and in what one has
observed of practice, there is a serious danger that the
dissipation of the compensation dollar on floods of minor
claims involving physical losses that are not disabling in
any meaningful sense will undermine the compensation
system itself and prevent the allocation of an adequate
proportion of the compensation dollar to the really seri-
ous cases of disability that are really what the system is all
about.
One of the things that makes the problem difficult is
that the practice of lump summing carries an immediate
appeal to literally every person concerned with a compen-
sation case. The employee naturally has his head turned
by the prospect of an enormous sum of money in one
chunk. His wife and children, relatives and friends, and
particularly creditors will all line up on the same side. His
lawyer may be the most enthusiastic of all about the
lump-sum principle since it means that he can get a re-
spectable fee all in one payment instead of having it drib-
bled out over a long period. The insurance carrier and
employer are glad to have the case closed and written off
their books. The administrator similarly is glad to mark
the case closed and remove it from his overcrowded
docket. Who then is to stand up and say, "Wait a minute;
you are all defeating the basic purpose of workmen's com-
pensation?" The only way this can be done is to write the
restrictions on lump summing into a statute in such cast-
iron terms that they cannot be circumvented.2 7 Better
still, since some of the toughest statutes have indeed been
circumvented, the statute might abolish the practice of
lump summing altogether. It could then get down to the
serious business of dealing with the specific problem of
how to arrange suitable compensation for an attorney in
cases of this kind,28 how to deal with the problem of
reopened cases, and so on.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION MUST DO A
COMPLETE JOB IN ITS SEGMENT OF
INCOME INSURANCE
Once it is accepted that workmen's compensation has
been given a particular sector of the total income-main-
tenance job to handle, just as unemployment insurance
and Social Security have, then it is readily seen that there
can be no possible excuse for not doing the job com-
pletely.
Workmen's compensation grew up at a time when it
was the only social insurance system in existence in the
United States. Accordingly, it did not have to face the
question here addressed. Anything it did in the way of
improving the lot of the injured worker was something of
a gain since, before workmen's compensation acts, injured
workers, for all practical purposes, got virtually nothing.
For this reason, the gaps in coverage, both as to persons
and as to injuries and diseases, did not look so conspicu-
ous. However, now that a large part of the total income-
insurance field has been blanketed, the continued failure
of some workmen's compensation acts to do a complete
job within their assigned area stands out as a shocking
breach of responsibility. Completeness as to coverage of
persons means eliminating small-firm exemptions, exemp-
tions for farmers, employees of charitable institutions,
and the like, and other special categories exempted under
certain statutes. It also means completeness of coverage of
injuries and diseases, which in turn means that failure to
have a comprehensive occupational disease statute is
insupportable.
Not least, completeness requires that the size of the
weekly benefits and the duration of the benefit period be
such that the disabled worker or his dependents are not
thrown on charity or relief. This obviously means the
elimination of all arbitrary top limits, whether by dollars
or by weeks, on total cumulative payments for actual dis-
ability, no matter whether it is called temporary or per-
manent. Nothing could be more preposterous than to
label a particular disability permanent, and then cut off
payments after 15 years. Suppose a man is totally perma-
nently disabled at the age of 21, and is paid benefits until
he is 36. What is he supposed to do then? To answer that
he should be picked up by public assistance is to betray
the integrity of the workmen's compensation principle
and abdicate the responsibility with which the system has
been entrusted. The same can be said of weekly maximum
benefits that are too low to permit survival under today's
cost of living. Here again, if the workmen's compensation
beneficiary has to supplement his compensation benefits
with public assistance, the system itself has failed.
MEDICAL EXPENSES AS RELATED TO
INCOME LOSS
The principles just discussed, particularly the princi-
ple that compensation benefits must be sufficiently com-
plete to obviate the necessity for resorting to public assis-
tance, lead to a corollary: if there are incidental expenses
that typically accompany the income loss and compensa-
tion claim, these incidental expenses must also be paid by
the system for the very obvious reason that if these ex-
penses are not paid, the recipient will not in fact get what
the system intends him to get.
The clearest expression of this principle in the typical
compensation act is the provision that medical and funeral
expenses accompanying a compensable injury must be
paid. This is mentioned here, although it might seem obvi-
ous, principally to show that the availability of medical
benefits under compensation law does not really consti-
tute an exception to the principle that workmen's com-
pensation is concerned with income maintenance. Al-
though payment of medical expenses is not in itself resto-
ration of a portion of lost income, in an indirect way it is
because if the income-insurance weekly benefits them-
selves were consumed in the payment of medical ex-
penses, it could hardly be said that the system was achiev-
ing its purpose. It is an easy step from here to the conclu-
sion that there must be no top limits on medical pay-
ments, since after the top limits had been reached, the
claimant's outlays for medical expenses would at that
point begin to defeat the income-maintenance objective of
workmen's compensation.
ATTORNEYS' FEES SHOULD NOT CUT INTO
COMPENSATION AWARDS
Although the principle just discussed has been more
or less unquestioned when applied to medical benefits, the
compensation system has from the start suffered from a
failure to recognize that forcing the claimant to absorb
attorneys' fees out of his award violates the same princi-
ple. The old common law idea, drawn from adversary pro-
ceedings, that each party must pay his own attorney as a
sort of necessary evil, has been imported bodily into this
income-insurance mechanism. It should hardly require any
argument at all to establish that, since the levels of work-
men's compension benefits are closely tailored to supply
the bare minimum needed by the claimant or his family to
avoid destitution, the purposes of the system are frus-
trated in proportion to the amount by which this award is
reduced for attorneys' fees. For a considerable period and
even now in most jurisdictions, the solution, if it is one,
has been at best to try to beat down the attorney's fees to
the absolute minimum. 2 9 The trouble with this is that it
deprives claimants of proper legal representation and puts
them at a disadvantage in competition with employers and
insurers who are under less financial compulsion to mini-
mize attorneys' fees.
The presence of this blind spot in workmen's com-
pensation is largely to be accounted for by the fact that
the original designers of the system, preposterous as it
now seems to us, had the idea that the services of lawyers
would practically never be necessary in compensation ad-
ministration. Indeed, this was one of the contrasts with
the undersirable common law system that was being re-
placed. How anyone could have made such an assumption,
and particularly how anyone could have postulated that
the statute would be largely self-interpreting and self-
executing when they contained such words as "em-
ployee," "arising out of," "course of employment," and
"by accident," is difficult to understand. In any event, the
system became saddled with this fiction, and for the most
part the results of the fiction have survived to this day in
all but a few States.
Once it is accepted that the amounts stated in the
statute are the amounts that the State intends should be
received by the claimant as the minimum necessary for his
support, and that in many cases the services of lawyers are
indispensable, there is no conceivable way to escape the
conclusion that the only satisfactory disposition of the
matter is to add attorneys' fees to the amount of the
award in appropriate cases. Several States have adopted
this course, notably Florida, 30 Maine, 3 i Nebraska,3 2 and
Delaware, 3 3 and several others in a more limited way.
3 4
The most common practical objection, as might be ex-
pected, is the argument that this measure would encour-
age litigiousness and unnecessary hiring of lawyers. The
answer to this argument is that the provision can be so
drafted as to deal specifically with this danger, as has been
done in the Council of State Governments draft.3 5
PROMPTNESS AND SIMPLICITY OF
ADMINISTRATION
The underlying principle that workmen's compensa-
tion is an income-protection device leads naturally to the
corollary that income must be provided quickly and with
a minimum of administrative complexity. Here again
workmen's compensation must be distinguished from tort
recoveries. In an ordinary law suit, a person may perhaps
be able to wait for years while he vindicates his right to
some large amount of damages. In cases of industrial in-
juries and death, however, the presumption is that the
worker or his dependents need weekly income immedi-
ately to replace what has been lost. Therefore, at every
point that a choice can be made between simplicity and
promptness of administration on the one hand, and more
complex or time-consuming procedures on the other, even
if the latter may perhaps in the end yield a larger re-
covery, the presumption should be in favor of the former.
This point has obvious implications for basic choices on
administrative method. Thus, the direct-payment method
is clearly more in line with this objective than a method in
which a formal claim is always necessary, and perhaps
even a court procedure. It also has implications for such
diverse features of compensation acts as penalties for de-
lay in payment 3 6 and forbidding of a stay of payments
pending appeals. 3
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Moreover, this principle suggests that, in the drafting
of compensation statutes, no effort should be spared to
eliminate in advance possible sources of controversy on
interpretation, even if this requires a lot of words. Many
time the expenditure of 50 more words in a statute can
forestall the expenditure of 50,000 words of judicial inter-
pretation. Brevity is not necessarily a virtue in this con-
text. An interesting example of draftsmanship based on
this approach is the second-injury fund clause in the
Council of State Governments draft.3 8 In addressing itself
to the question of what prior injuries or illnesses are
covered, the Council draft begins by setting out a long list
of named conditions and diseases, in the process mention-
ing probably 98 percent of the known conditions that
figure in second-injury fund cases. This portion is then
followed by a catch-all clause indicating that any other
condition would stand as a prior physical impairment if it
would support a disability rating of 200 weeks or more.
At this point, someone might ask why it would not have
been just as well to write in the catch-all clause and omit
the list of 26 specific conditions, since the end result
would probably be almost exactly the same. The answer is
that the result might indeed have been the same, but only
after litigation in some cases to establish that the particu-
lar prior impairment was covered because it adequately
satisfied the general definition. For example, the specific
list includes such items as cardiac disease and psychoneu-
rotic disability, conditions which are not accepted as prior
impairments in many second-injury provisions. Adminis-
tration is greatly simplified and litigation minimized by
the fact that if claimant has one of the conditions specifi-
cally list, the matter stops right there, whereas under a
general definition there might have been an argument
about the matter. Innumerable instances could be cited in
which even a word or two in the statute would have fore-
stalled literally dozens of cases if the draftsmen could
have anticipated the controversy over interpretation that
was to ensue. Since we have now had more than a half
century of experience with what kinds of provisions
stimulate litigation and what kinds of provisions can be
used to put the same matters to rest by statutory
language, any overhauling of compensation statutes
should leave no stone unturned to anticipate and put
beyond controversy any cloudy point that can be made
clear by precise statutory language.
COORDINATION WITH OTHER
SOCIAL INSURANCE
The implications of the concept of workmen's com-
pensation as one branch of overall social insurance have
already been touched upon under the first heading, parti-
cularly as controversy over the Social Security offset pro-
vision for workmen's compensation is affected by an un-
derstanding of this principle. Since the Federal Govern-
ment has now taken upon itself the responsibility of ap-
plying the offset, perhaps the controversy over whether
the offset should be applied at the Federal or State end
can be assumed to be behind us. During the interlude
when there was some question whether the offset was to
be imposed at the Federal or State end, several States
themselves enacted an offset of workmen's compensation
benefits for Social Security benefits. 3 9 It takes very little
imagination to picture the kind of dizzying cycle one can
get into when two statutes offset their benefits by the
amount of benefits paid or to be paid by the other.40 For
this reason, it probably would be in the interests of simpli-
city and clarity to repeal all of the State offset provisions,
leaving the Federal Social Security Act to do any offset-
ting that is to be done. It would follow that efforts to
achieve improvement in this area would best be addressed
to studies of how the Federal offset provision is working,
and how it can be improved to remove uncertainties and
inequities where they have appeared.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND
AMERICAN VALUES
Not the least of the underlying principles that should
be kept in mind in any adjustment of the American work-
men's compensation system is the principle that distinc-
tive American traditions and values that have been super-
imposed upon models drawn from England and the Con-
tinent should be respected and preserved as far as possible.
These values and traditions can be grouped under two
headings.
The first of these two items has to do with the dis-
tinction between countries whose approach is essentially
socialistic and a country like the United States whose ap-
proach is essentially private enterprise and decentralized.
In most socialist regimes, there are two presumptions suf-
fusing the handling of public issues: the presumption that
governmental action is better than private and the pre-
sumption that centralized government is better than de-
centralized. In the United States the presumptions are
exactly the reverse. Consciously or unconsciously, we
have always proceeded on the conviction that, other
things being equal, it is better to do things through private
means than through government means, and that if it is
necessary to do things by government means, it is better
to do the job by State or local government rather than by
Federal government. What appears to be a crazy patch-
work of State, Federal, and local activities, not to men-
tion public and private measures, in the American social
insurance total coverage, becomes a perfectly logical and
consistent pattern when viewed against the two presump-
tions just stated. Thus, Federal Social Security had to be
Federal, not because the American people as a matter of
ideology had any preference for a centralized Federal
system, but because as a practical matter the job to be
done was far too great for private insurance and obviously
unmanageable by individual States. Therefore, by default
the task had to be done by the Federal Government if it
was to be done at all.
There may be those who do not agree with either of
the presumptions here stated, but it is a fact of history
that these two presumptions have been operative at al-
most every point. There can, of course, be considerable
disagreement on the factual question whether private en-
terprise and States can indeed do the particular job in
question. Thus, some people argue that the States' handl-
ing of workmen's compensation has demonstrated that
the States cannot really do a satisfactory job and that the
cost of private insurance has shown that private insurance
is not appropriate for workmen's compensation. The
writer disagrees strongly on both points, but the principal
submission here is that, at the minimum, there is and
should be a presumption in favor of doing a job at the
private and State level, as against the public and Federal
level, and that any departure from these presumptions
would be a marked departure from what we have come to
think of as the American way of doing things.
The other basic American value that must never be
lost sight of is the high American regard for individuality
and for the dignity of the individual person. The most
direct reflection of this emphasis on individuality in the
American social insurance system is the practice of basing
social insurance benefits in all categories, not just work-
men's compensation, on the individual's own wage record.
This procedure enormously complicates the task of record
keeping and administration, but we have concluded that it
is worth the trouble in order to maintain some link be-
tween a particular worker's own earnings level and his
benefits. In many social insurance systems around the
world, this is not so and flat-rate benefits are paid to all
beneficiaries regardless of their previous earnings records.
Indeed, it can be demonstrated that the American system
of basing Social Security benefits on individual wage
records would have collapsed long ago due to the sheer
weight of record keeping and calculation involved if the
invention of the computer had not fortunately intervened.
Of course, we surround the individual wage calculation
with maximum and minimum limits, and it is in this
process that we are in serious danger of violating the indi-
viduality principle. As long as there is plenty of elbow
room between the maximum and the minimum to cover
most workers, it can be said that the system is indeed
based on individual earnings history. But when, as has
happened in many States, the fixed weekly maximum for
workmen's compensation benefits actually falls below
even the average wage in the State, the situation can only
be described as converting the individualistic American
system into a socialistic type of flat-rate benefit structure.
And when, as in some States, the majority of benefits are
crushed together into one uniform figure under the maxi-
mum, anyone who insists on retaining such a low maxi-
mum can be told, withput facetiousness, that he is in
effect advocating the substitution of a socialist benefit
system for an individualistic American system.
The concept of the dignity of the individual is, of
course, central to the preference for social insurance as
against public assistance. In spite of the fact that public
assistance in recent years is taking on more and more of
the attributes of a benefit claimed of right, still the classi-
cal distinction between social insurance and public assis-
tance has always been that insured benefits belong to the
insured claimant as of right, while assistance benefits are
paid only on the basis of need as determined by adminis-
trators. It follows, then, that anyone who insists on keep-
ing compensation benefits so low that a substantial num-
ber of compensation recipients are driven to seek public
assistance is directly offending the American concept of
the dignity of the individual.
Finally, the emphasis on individual dignity and worth
compels the conclusion that every conceivable effort
should be made to rehabilitate the injured workers who
come within the province of the workmen's compensation
system. Dignity of the individual is served best of all when
the individual can go back to work, earn his own living,
pay his own taxes, and hold his head up as a proud and
useful member of the work force. The practical conclu-
sion from this is that American workmen's compensation
statutes should be thoroughly examined with a view to
strengthening their rehabilitation provisions. There is
much more to this than merely a few extra allowances for
a rehabilitation period or for travel expenses and the like.
The entire administration of workmen's compensation
must be suffused from beginning to end with the concept
of restoration of the worker rather than merely handing
him a sum of money as a pay-off for his injury. Special
officers and units concerned with rehabilitation should be
built right into the administrative structure; appropriate
incentives to become rehabilitated must be included; dis-
incentives in the form of cut-off of benefits must be
guarded against; and above all a much greater effort must
be made than ever before to provide proper rehabilitation
facilities throughout the country and to coordinate all
Federal and State rehabilitation activities.
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